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How do trade activities aﬀect ﬁrms’ employment and wages structures? Using ﬁrm
level data on Italian manufacturing ﬁrms, this paper adds to the existing literature, by
assessing how the degree of involvement in international trade impacts on workforce
composition, earning levels and wage inequality. We diﬀerentiate ﬁrms involved in
both trading activities - namely two-way traders - from ﬁrms that only export, and
from those that only import. We show that two-way traders have a higher propensity
to employ non-production workers, exhibit signiﬁcant wage gaps, but also pay higher
wages for both production and non production workers, relative to non international-
ized ﬁrms and to ﬁrms which are involved only in either export or import. The paper
also looks at how the wages and the skill structure of the trading ﬁrms change with
the country of destination and origin and with the ﬁrms’ sectoral and geographical
diversiﬁcation.
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11 Introduction
The standard prediction from Heckscher-Ohlin theory is that the distributional impact of
trade operates through changes in the relative prices of tradable goods inducing the ex-
pansion of some industries and the contraction of others. Countries having a more skilled
labour force should specialize in industries that use such factors more intensively. As a
result of an expansion of trade, the relative price of goods that use less skilled labour
more intensively should fall (and those of skill intensive goods increase) which in turn
should reduce the aggregate relative demand and, ceteris paribus, the relative wages of
the factors used in producing these goods domestically. Hence the traditional view implies
that international trade should have the eﬀect of moving workers from contracting indus-
tries towards expanding ones, changing the aggregate ratio between skilled and unskilled
workers and their relative wages.
In contrast with the standard trade theory, much of the empirical literature has high-
lighted that the largest proportion of the observed changes in the relative employment
of non production workers is due to within industry movements (Berman et al. (1994),
Bernard and Jensen (1997), Heitger and Stehn (2003)). Among others, Berman et al.
(1998) ﬁnd that both the rise in the demand for skilled workers and the increase in wage
inequality in the US economy can be attributed to the within industry skill upgrading
rather than to a reallocation of employment between industries.
This has induced most scholars to consider that the main driver to employment shifts
and wage inequality is not international trade, and spurred them to look for other explana-
tions, the most acknowledged of which is the skill biased technical change view. According
to this view, rapid technological change, especially when associated with the widespread
introduction of computers, modiﬁes the workforce composition, increasing the employ-
ment share of skilled workers and reducing the demand for unskilled workers and thereby
their wages. Following this line of reasoning the skill biased technical change causes a skill
upgrading within each sector (Katz and Murphy (1992); Bound and Johnson (1992)).
However, at least some of the observed within sector changes in labour composition
and relative wages can also be attributed to international trade once intra-industry het-
erogeneity is allowed for, and the possibility that ﬁrms active in a given sector diﬀer in
terms of their international involvement is acknowledged. Recent trade models have put
these issues at center stage (Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), Yeaple (2005)). Melitz
(2003) assumes that ﬁrms vary in terms of innate productivity, assigned according to a
random draw, and relates ﬁrms’ decision to export to their productivity level. Due to self-
selection, only the most productive ﬁrms enter the foreign market while less productive
ﬁrms will restrict their activity to their home market. Given diﬀerences in productivity
levels, the relative magnitude of ﬁxed and variable costs determines the export status of
ﬁrms. Hence, this model allows for the co-existence in the same sector of both exporters
and non exporters. Yeaple (2005) jointly considers workers heterogeneity, diﬀerences in
technology, and trade costs, and derives important conclusions in terms of the eﬀect of
trade on skill premia. In particular, this model assumes that ﬁrms are identical when
born while workers diﬀer in terms of their skills. In general equilibrium, some ﬁrms choose
new technologies that allow them to lower their unit cost. In presence of ﬁxed costs to
enter the foreign markets, only the ﬁrms adopting the new technologies will export, since
they are able to sell a larger quantity proﬁtably. Therefore exporting ﬁrms are larger and
more technologically advanced with respect non internationalized ﬁrms. Moreover, since
2the adoption of the new technologies requires employing workers with a relatively high
skill level, the exporting ﬁrms have a more skilled workforce and pay higher wages (both
to blue and white collars). A reduction in trade costs increases the share of exporting
ﬁrms and, hence, it raises the aggregate relative demand. As a consequence, the aggregate
wage gap and the wage premia that exporters pay to their blue and white collar workers
increases.
Empirical literature, increasingly based on ﬁrm level data, has recognized that dif-
ferences of international involvement within industries may be associated with diversities
in labour composition and in relative wages. Indeed, these contributions have reached
diﬀerent conclusions from those obtained using industry level data, suggesting that trade
may have a key role in explaining the increase in the demand for skilled workers and the
rise of wage inequality.
Bernard and Jensen (1997) show that in US the increase of the relative demand for
skilled workers and of the skill premium were mainly driven by between ﬁrm shifts, often
within the same industry, toward exporting ﬁrms. They also highlight that these between
ﬁrms movements are related to increases in international demand and not to technological
upgrading. In a similar vein, Manasse and Stanca (2003)1 focus on Italian manufacturing
ﬁrms and decompose the within industry eﬀect into a between and a within plant com-
ponent, ﬁnding that exports has induced a between ﬁrms reallocation but in the opposite
way, shifting away employment from skill-intensive ﬁrms. This result is consistent with
the peculiarity of the Italian trade specialization model which, compared to other industri-
alized countries, is more oriented towards unskilled intensive traditional goods. Biscourp
and Kramarz (2007), using ﬁrm level data for France, decompose the aggregate changes of
the skill labor force composition into a between-ﬁrm and a within-ﬁrm component as well.
However, they also account for a further heterogeneity in internationalization strategies,
by distinguishing exporting ﬁrms from those active in import activities.
Other studies have more broadly examined the relationship between export activity
and ﬁrm performances. These studies have overwhelmingly found that exporters are larger,
more productive, more capital intensive than ﬁrms producing solely for the domestic mar-
ket. By looking at the workforce composition and at the employments’ earnings, most
of these contributions have reached the conclusion that exporting ﬁrms pay higher wages
and have more skilled workers than their domestic counterparts 2.
Consistent with the increasing attention given by theoretical and empirical literature
to the links between intra-industry heterogeneity and distributional patterns, we use ﬁrm
level data on Italian ﬁrms to highlight that ﬁrms involved in international trade exhibit
peculiar characteristics in terms of workforce composition and wage inequality. The avail-
able information on import and export enable us to diﬀerentiate ﬁrms involved in both
trading activities - which we identify with the term “two-way traders” - from ﬁrms that
only export, and from those that only import. This distinction has two important impli-
cations. On the one hand, it helps overcome a frequent limitation in international trade
literature, which has been mainly focused on exports while imports have largely been left
out of empirical studies. On the other hand, by considering ﬁrms that are involved in
1While Bernard and Jensen (1997) focus on the between-within decomposition considering separately
the relative wage bill and the ratio of non production workers to total employment, Manasse and Stanca
(2003) introduce an innovativeness by decomposing the overall change in the non-manual share of the wage
bill into the respective contributions of the employment share and the wage premium.
2See Schank et al. (2006) for a synopsis of studies on wage diﬀerentials associated to exporting activities.
3both imports and exports, it addresses the issues of whether the degree of involvement
in international trade is associated with employment structure and wages. While a large
number of studies which we have brieﬂy reviewed above have highlighted that exporters
are normally more skilled and contribute to sectoral wage inequalities, a few works anal-
yse the characteristics of importers focusing mainly on their productivity premia (Tucci
(2005), Bernard et al. (2007), Halpern et al. (2005)). Even fewer analyses consider both
import and export activities and show how these tend to be concentrated in the hands of
a minority of ﬁrms which trade a large number of products to a large number of countries
(Bernard et al. (2005), Muuls and Pisu (2007)). However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no evidence at all concerning both the employment and the wage structure of
ﬁrms which are simultaneously involved in import and in export activities 3. This is quite
surprising given the increasing importance of international fragmentation of production,
implying that more and more ﬁrms are active in both imports and exports of intermediate
and ﬁnal goods. As particularly emphasised by Feenstra and Hanson (2004) trade of this
type aﬀects labour demand of ﬁrms producing the inputs in competition with imports,
but also impacts on labour demand of ﬁrms using the imported inputs. This suggests
that ﬁrms engaged in what is often deﬁned as “global production sharing”, which involves
both import and export of goods corresponding to diﬀerent stages of the overall vertical
production process, may be particularly exposed to changes in employment composition
and in relative wages of workers.
This paper also sheds some light on two other interesting issues previously unexplored.
Firstly, we assess whether the wages and the skill structure of trading ﬁrms change with the
country of destination and origin. This empirical exercise is helpful in examining whether
diﬀerent competencies are required for ﬁrms exporting (or importing) to diﬀerent markets.
The idea is that the workforce composition and/or the earnings may vary depending on the
geographical, cultural or developmental “distance” of the markets of destination or origin.
Secondly, we consider how the labour characteristics of trading ﬁrms are correlated with
their sectoral and geographic diversiﬁcation, as proxied by the number of products ﬁrms
trade and by the number of countries with which they trade, respectively. This is in line
with recent research carried out by Bernard et al. (2007), which highlights the relevance
of the two extensive margins - i.e. the number of destinations served by a ﬁrm and the
number of products exported by a ﬁrm - in understanding trading ﬁrms’ heterogeneity
and aggregate patterns of international trade.
The rest of this paper has the following structure. Section 2 describes the data-sources
we use and how trade activities, workforce composition and wages can be measured using
them. Section 3 provides an overview of how diﬀerences in Italian ﬁrms’ involvement in
international trade are associated with diversities in skill composition, wage levels and
inequality. Section 4 will introduce some econometric exercises which exploit the whole
time span of data available and check the robustness of the unconditional picture oﬀered
in Section 3, once observed and unobserved sources of heterogeneity are controlled for.
Section 5 illustrates how the whole picture is aﬀected by diﬀerences across ﬁrms according
to the market of origin or destination of their import and export activities; and according
to the degree of sectoral and geographic diversiﬁcation of their international trade. Section
6 will summarise the results and conclude.
3Bernard et al. (2007) look at the employment and the skill composition of the two-way traders, but
not wages; while Muuls and Pisu (2007) consider only the employment level.
42 Data description
This paper relies upon a data panel which combines two diﬀerent datasets developed by
Italy’s Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT), namely MICRO 1 and COE 4. MICRO 1 contains
longitudinal data on a panel of 38.771 ﬁrms representing the entire universe of Italian
manufacturing companies with 20 employees or more over the 1989-97 period. The entry
and exit of ﬁrms in and out of the Italian manufacturing industry over the observation
period, as well as the existence of missing values, makes of MICRO 1 an unbalanced
panel data-set, containing information for an average of around 20.000 ﬁrms per year.
Firms are classiﬁed according to their principal activity, as identiﬁed by ISTAT’s standard
codes for sectoral classiﬁcation of business (Ateco), which correspond, to a large extent,
to Eurostat’s NACE 1.1 taxonomy. The database contains information on a number of
variables appearing in a ﬁrm’s balance sheet. For the purpose of this work we utilize the
following pieces of information: number of employees, type of occupation of employees,
labor costs, wages, industry and geographical location (Italian regions). All the nominal
variables are measured in millions of 1995 Italian liras and they are deﬂated using various
2 digit industry-level price indices provided by ISTAT 5.
As regards the workforce composition separate pieces of information are available for
production workers (including blue collars, assistants, trainees and home-based workers)6
and non-production workers (comprising managers and clerks)7. For the purpose of this
paper we consider production and non-production workers as a proxy of the distinction
between unskilled and skilled workers, respectively 8. For each of these two groups we have
access to labor cost data, distinguishing between the wage paid to the worker (salary and
severance-pay) and the total cost paid by the ﬁrm (salary, corporate income taxation and
severance-pay). In line with previous empirical analyses (Bernard and Jensen (1997) and
Biscourp and Kramarz (2007)), we construct a measure of ﬁrms’ skill composition, given
by the percentage of non production workers over the total number of employees, and a
measure of wage gap, computed as the ratio between the average wage of non production
workers to the average wage of production workers.
The MICRO1 database has been merged with ISTAT’s external trade register (COE)9,
which provides ﬁrm-level information on exports and imports over the 1993-1997 period.
For each of the about 17,000 ﬁrms surveyed on average in the observation period, COE
supplies data on ﬁrms’ trade status and their volume of trade. Moreover, data are available
on the destination of exports, the origin of imports 10, the number of sectors in which a
ﬁrm exports (in a four digit sectoral classiﬁcation system) and the number of countries
served (NSE and NCE, respectively), the number of sectors in which a ﬁrm imports and
4The databases have been made available under the mandatory condition of censorship of any individual
information.
5Wages are deﬂated by the consumer price index. Labor cost are deﬂated using value added index.
6Respectively, operai, commessi, apprendisti and lavoratori a domicilio.
7Respectively, dirigenti and impiegati.
8See Berman et al. (1994) for a discussion on this categorization.
9Detailed information on the implementation of the COE database on foreign trade statistics are avail-
able at www.coeweb.istat.it
10We consider six geo-economic zones: 1) CEE and EFTA; 2) Usa, Canada and other advanced
economies; 3) OPEC; 4) NIEs ;5) CEECs and 6) Other countries. ISTAT provides an online detailed
description of the geo-economic classiﬁcation at www.coeweb.istat.it/english/default.htm.
5Table 1: Number of ﬁrms












the number of countries a ﬁrm imports from (NSI and NCI, respectively)11.
The merging of balance sheet data with trade statistics implies a reduction in the
size of our sample, which leaves us with an unbalanced database for an average of about
12.100 ﬁrms, covering the period between 1993 and 1997. Table 1 presents the number
of ﬁrms active within the manufacturing sector, for the original MICRO1 database and
for the database obtained after the merge with the foreign survey (merged database).
The size of the sample stemming from the merge with COE trading data corresponds to
approximately 60% of the sample obtained from MICRO 1 alone. In order to check the
consistency of the panel obtained through the merge of the two datasets, we compare the
sectoral and the size distribution of the new sample of ﬁrms with the one characterizing
the entire population of ﬁrms in MICRO 1 database. The test we compute conﬁrms that
our merged database is not statistically diﬀerent from the entire population of ﬁrms, with
respect to both their sectoral and their size distribution (see Appendix 1 for details).
Table 2 presents summary statistics, from 1993 to 1997, on all manufacturing ﬁrms,
together with average values for a number of sub-samples of ﬁrms grouped according
to geographical location, size, sector and foreign ownership structure 12. In 1993-97 we
observe positive growth rates for both employment and wages. The largest increases are
detected for the number of employees and for non production workers wages, which rose by
14.3 and 9.6 percentage points respectively, over the examined periods. A higher stability
is instead observed for average wages, production wages and wage gaps.
The majority of ﬁrms (75%) are from the North of Italy, 62% are ﬁrms with less
than 50 employees (small ﬁrms), 56% belong to the so-called traditional sectors (supplier
dominated), while only 2% are foreign owned ﬁrms. While the latter ﬁgure reﬂects the
very strict deﬁnition of foreign owned ﬁrms, as allowed by the available data (see footnote
12 ), this subsample will enable us to partially capture the speciﬁcity of multinationals in
terms of employment and wage structure.
11The number of sectors are counted according to the 4-digit NACE classiﬁcation system.
12A ﬁrm is deﬁned as foreign owned when the majority of its capital assets is controlled by foreign
shareholders. This is a very restrictive deﬁnition which has implications on the size of this subsample of
ﬁrms.
6Table 2: Descriptive statistics, all ﬁrms
N. Empl % of NPW Wage Wage NPW Wage PW Wage Gap % of ﬁrms
Average Value 103 22.47 33.75 46.83 31.66 1.486
1993 99 22.04 32.78 44.96 30.89 1.464
1994 96 21.97 32.99 45.01 31.24 1.445
1995 102 22.24 33.44 45.87 31.40 1.470
1996 109 22.96 36.01 50.28 33.61 1.543
1997 115 23.68 34.31 49.75 31.63 1.536
Growth rate 93-97 14.3% 6.9% 4.5% 9.6% 2.3% 4.7%
North 109 24.08 34.94 48.14 32.502 1.500 75%
Center 91 18.93 31.27 42.99 30.157 1.422 15%
South 74 15.42 28.37 41.85 27.420 1.470 10%
Small (<50) 31 19.47 31.05 43.45 30.40 1.406 62.6%
Medium (51-250) 99 26.16 37.10 50.46 33.19 1.589 31.8%
Large (251-500) 347 33.10 43.33 58.25 36.24 1.682 3.5%
Very large (>500) 1944 38.36 47.65 63.11 38.36 1.711 2.1%
Supplier dominated 65 17.63 30.49 43.73 29.36 1.474 56.2%
Scale intensive 170 24.13 37.30 50.96 34.51 1.507 24.2%
Specialised suppliers 94 30.98 38.08 49.32 35.08 1.463 15.4%
Science based 262 46.14 41.02 51.36 33.37 1.592 4.3%
Non Foreign Owned 92 22.07 33.46 46.49 31.52 1.480 97.8%
Foreign Owned 613 40.43 46.72 60.81 37.71 1.720 2.2%
Note: Monetary values are expressed in millions of 1995 Italian liras
A remarkable heterogeneity is detected across sub-samples, in terms of both wages and
employment structure. The classiﬁcation based on geographical distribution reveals that
ﬁrms localised in the North are bigger, use more skilled labour, pay higher wages to non
production and production workers and exhibit a higher wage gap than those localised
in the Center and in the South. Higher average values for employment and wages are
observable also for very large ﬁrms. For these ﬁrms the share of non production workers is
twice as high as in the case of small ﬁrms, 50% and 15% higher compared to ﬁrms belonging
to the category of medium and large size ﬁrms, respectively. The same ranking between
the four size categories holds when looking at wage levels: highest salaries are detected for
very large ﬁrms, followed by large, medium and small ﬁrms. Moreover, the greater the ﬁrm
size the higher the average wage gap. Similarly, foreign owned ﬁrms employ a substantially
higher number of employees (613 on average) and they have a higher percentage of white
collars (40%) with respect to non foreign owned ﬁrms. Moreover, the pay on average
higher salaries for both white and blue collars, and display an higher wage gap.
Science based sectors are characterized by the largest ﬁrm size. They also exhibit
the highest percentage of white collars (46%) and the highest average wages and non
production workers wages (41 and 51 millions Italian liras, respectively), and the highest
average wage gap. By contrast, ﬁrms belonging to the suppliers dominated sectors are
7Table 3: Diﬀerences between non-traders and other trading categories (average values
1993-1997)
Niether Exp. Only Only Two way
nor Imp. Exp Imp Traders
Absolute value
Num. Employees 40 78 59 132
% Non Prod Work 12.22 20.04 20.56 26.63
Wage 28.42 31.61 34.15 35.88
Wage Non Prod Work 42.56 43.61 46.50 48.34
Wage Prod Work 28.54 30.74 32.88 32.79
Wage Gap 1.391 1.433 1.464 1.518
Relative value*
Num. Employees 100 196.4 149.1 332.0
% Non Prod Work 100 164.1 168.3 218.0
Wage 100 111.2 120.2 126.3
Wage Non Prod Work 100 102.5 109.3 113.6
Wage Prod Work 100 107.7 115.2 114.9
Wage Gap 100 103.0 105.2 109.1
% of ﬁrms 24.19 5.48 5.08 65.24
* 100 = Neither Exporters nor Importers
those with the lowest number of employees and percentage of white collars, and those
paying the lowest wage premium, to both white and blue collars.
3 Traders and non traders: some empirical facts
How do ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of employment composition and wages according to their
involvement in international trade? In this section we highlight some important empirical
facts whose robustness we shall test econometrically in section4 .
In Table 3 and Table 4 we look at the employment and wage indicators, diﬀerentiating
ﬁrms according to their participation into international markets. In Table 3 we introduce
a basic distinction between ﬁrms serving the national market only, which we identify as
“non traders”, and internationalized ﬁrms, and we further group the latter into three
classes: only importers, only exporters, and ﬁrms involved in both import and export
activities, which we name “two way traders”. As anticipated in Section 1, this is per
se a partial novelty in the empirical literature, as most international trade contributions
normally concentrate on exports. By contrast, we argue that on the one hand, imports may
have diﬀerent implications in terms of skill requirements and knowledge accumulation, as
compared to exports. Moreover, two-way traders are even more exposed to international
competition than both only-importers and only-exporters, and this makes this category of
ﬁrms particularly interesting when considering employment composition and distributional
patterns.
8Table 3 shows that, while about 75% of ﬁrms are involved in international trade,
two way traders are by far the largest share of internationalized ﬁrms, with an average
participation rate of 65%.
Four important facts immediately emerge from the data. First, two-way traders are
much larger than ﬁrms active only in the domestic market: the former are more than
three times as big as the latter in terms of number of employees. Second, two way traders
employ more than twice as many white collars as compared to non traders. Third, they
pay much higher wages to both production and non production workers, relative to non
internationalized ﬁrms. Fourth, the wage gap between white and blue collars is about 10%
greater in the case of two-way traders relative to non internationalized ﬁrms.
This set of empirical facts is consistent with the idea put forth in recent trade liter-
ature: dealing with foreign markets is associated with diﬀerential sunk costs in terms of
headquarter services and superior technology, which can only be aﬀorded by larger ﬁrms
with more skilled workers. A larger proportion of non production workers is needed to
tackle these activities, raising the relative demand for such workers and creating more
wage inequality; but higher quality production workers are also needed to handle new
technology, implying higher salaries for blue collars too (Yeaple (2005)). This is only part
of the story: some ex-post eﬀect might be associated to international involvement, includ-
ing access to foreign sources of knowledge, leading to a further accumulation of skills. This
is consistent with a view of internationalization as a channel for learning and technology
sourcing. While this view is increasingly being shared in the literature on international
production (Narula and Zanfei (2005), Griﬃth et al. (2006)), there is still limited evi-
dence of the fact that such ex-post eﬀects can be associated to trade (Wagner (2005)).
Besides, whether ex-post eﬀects on productivity will eventually translate into increasing
wages and disparities in workers’ earnings can be debated. Suﬃce here to observe that our
descriptive statistics are consistent with both (ex ante and ex post) mechanisms leading
to intra-industry diﬀerences in employment composition and wages.
It is important to stress that we ﬁnd both higher wage levels and inequality. In other
words, in spite of higher disparities, working in Italy’s internationalized ﬁrms is more re-
warding for both skilled and unskilled workers in terms of absolute wage levels. In fact,
while wage gaps between production and non production workers are larger in interna-
tionalized ﬁrms, both categories of workers obtain higher wages when they are employed
by these companies and they are worse oﬀ when they are employed by ﬁrms active in the
domestic market only.
A ﬁfth important empirical fact emerging from the evidence is that ﬁrms partially
involved in international trade, either with import or with export activities, rank between
non internationalized ﬁrms and two way traders in terms of size, share of non production
workers, wage levels, and wage gap. This could reﬂect the fact that both self selection
mechanisms and post-entry eﬀects are lower for ﬁrms active in import or export market
only, relative to ﬁrms involved in two-way trade. We suggest that this fact further rein-
forces the idea that ﬁrm’s heterogeneity can be better captured by analyzing trade ﬂows
in greater details.
As a sixth empirical fact, one can observe that some diﬀerences between importers and
exporters do seem to exist. On the one hand, a lower size threshold seems to be required
in order to engage into import rather than export activities. Only exporters are more than
30% larger than only importers. On the other hand, only importers exhibit a higher share
of non production workers and pay on average higher wages than only exporters, both
9Table 4: Descriptive statistics: Two way Traders vs Neither Exporters nor Importers
N. Empl % of NPW Wage Wage NPW Wage PW Wage Gap % of ﬁrms*
T** NT** T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT
Average Value 132 40 26.6 12.2 35.9 28.4 48.3 42.6 32.8 28.5 1.52 1.39
1993 131 38 26.5 11.6 35.3 26.7 47.1 38.8 32.3 27.0 1.50 1.37 62 24
1994 124 37 26.4 11.0 35.5 26.6 47.0 39.1 32.8 27.1 1.47 1.36 63 23
1995 128 42 26.1 13.3 35.5 28.6 47.4 41.5 32.6 28.6 1.50 1.4 70 30
1996 138 39 27.0 11.1 37.2 32.8 51.0 48.2 33.8 33.0 1.57 1.450 68 20
1997 146 44 27.5 14.2 36.3 29.3 50.4 49.1 32.6 28.8 1.58 1.41 64 24
Growth rate 93-97 (%) 10.6 12.8 3.8 18.2 2.8 8.9 6.5 20.8 0.8 6.1 4.9 2.8
North 136 37 27.6 12.4 36.6 29.2 49.3 43.5 33.3 29.5 1.53 1.38 72 19
Center 114 40 22.7 12.4 32.7 28.8 43.2 43.1 30.9 28.8 1.44 1.40 55 33
South 115 49 20.4 11.6 31.3 26.0 44.4 39.4 29.2 25.7 1.53 1.43 32 52
Small (<50) 30 28 24.5 11.5 33.0 27.7 44.3 41.8 31.6 28.2 1.43 1.36 54 33
Medium (51-250) 94 82 27.7 15.8 37.7 32.0 51.0 45.6 33.5 30.2 1.60 1.53 83 10
Large (251-500) 352 344 33.4 28.8 43.4 41.9 58.4 53.9 36.2 35.5 1.68 1.69 93 3
Very large (>500) 1765 1300 38.9 25.6 47.9 45.1 63.5 58.0 38.4 40.4 1.72 1.44 94 3
Supplier dominated 84 35 21.6 10.0 32.4 26.7 44.9 41.2 30.4 27.1 1.51 1.39 59 30
Scale intensive 212 52 26.8 15.6 38.7 32.8 52.4 46.3 35.1 32.5 1.54 1.39 70 17
Specialised suppliers 107 49 34.1 17.6 39.5 32.1 50.8 43.1 35.7 32.3 1.49 1.37 77 16
Science based 302 41 50.9 26.2 43.8 30.7 53.4 43.0 34.8 27.9 1.62 1.43 75 16
Non Foreign Owned 116 40 26.2 12.2 35.5 28.4 47.9 42.5 32.6 28.5 1.51 1.39 65 25
Foreign Owned 634 135 40.7 30.3 46.9 39.6 61.0 52.8 37.8 31.8 1.72 1.66 94 2
Note: Monetary values are expressed in millions of 1995 Italian liras.
* The percentage of ﬁrms is computed with respect to the total number of ﬁrms within each sub-sample (including ﬁrms with only import and only export);
** T stand for Two-way Traders, NT for Non-Traders.
1
0for white and blue collars. Both of these pieces of empirical evidence are less outstanding
from descriptive statistics, and will thus need to be tested more carefully with econometric
techniques. It is worth anticipating that these diﬀerences might reﬂect both the sectoral
and geographic composition of import and export markets; and structural characteristics
of the two categories of ﬁrms.
In Table 4 we further examine the diﬀerences between two-way traders and non-traders,
classifying ﬁrms according to their characteristics (as in Table 2). Looking at the 1993-
1997 growth rate we observe that, with the only exception of wage gaps, the increase
in terms of share of white collars and in wages has been larger for non traders than for
ﬁrms involved in international trade. Moreover, ﬁgures suggest that the basic diﬀerences
between two-way traders and non traders hold across all the groups considered. Firms
involved in both import and export are bigger, use more skill labour, pay higher salaries
and display an higher wage gap compared to non traders, regardless of the geographical
location, size, sector and ownership structure.
However, while the above facts are largely conﬁrmed, the intensity of these phenomena
signiﬁcantly diﬀers across the examined ﬁrm categories. This can be observed if one
computed the ratio between two-way traders’ values and non-traders’ ones. Considering
the classiﬁcation based on size, we observe that the “distance” between ﬁrms involved in
international trade and those serving only the domestic market is higher for small ﬁrms
than for medium, large and very large ﬁrms. One explanation of this could be the fact
that, in order to enter the foreign markets, small ﬁrms need to sustain higher eﬀorts than
their larger size counterpart. As a consequence, self-selection mechanisms could be lower
for larger ﬁrms relative to small ﬁrms.
In a similar way, the diﬀerence between internationalized and non internationalized
ﬁrms appears to be larger in the case of supplier dominated sectors as compared to other
industries. The former sectors, in which Italy exhibits a remarkable specialization, are in
fact those with the highest ratio between two way traders and non traders as far as the
proportion of white collar and the overall wage are concerned. This result seems to suggest
that ﬁrms active in these industries are the least endowed with skilled work-force when
competing in domestic markets, but need to at least partially compensate this weakness in
terms of qualiﬁed human capital to face international competition. This is consistent with
the idea that industrialized countries can stand competition with less developed countries
in traditional sectors more in terms of higher quality of production than in terms of
labour cost and price reduction. These results persist when data are further disaggregated
at 2-digit level. Table 2A, reported in Appendix 2, shows the average percentage of
non production workers belonging to the diﬀerent manufacturing sectors for all the ﬁrms’
categories considered, together with the ratio between the two way traders’ percentage
value and the non traders’ one. According to the last column of Table 2A, the highest
ratio is detected for apparel, leather and textiles.
When looking at the geographic distribution of ﬁrms, higher diﬀerences between two
way traders and non traders can be observed in the case of Northern regions. This might
appear to be somewhat surprising as these are the regions wherein barriers to trade are
lowest, hence ﬁrms could be expected to need a lower commitment to venture into foreign
markets. The lower ratio for the Southern ﬁrms could at least partially be explained by
the fact that the latter work mainly as subcontractors (Basile (2001)) and, consequently,
lower competencies (in terms of employment and wage) are required in order to enter the
foreign markets.
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12Data in Table 3 also reveal a high heterogeneity across two-way traders belonging to
the various sub-sample. Some diﬀerences emerge from the participation rate reported in
the last column of Table 4. In the Northern regions 72% of companies are two way traders
while ﬁrms localised in the Center exhibit a lower trade participation (55%) and in the
South more than half of ﬁrms (52%) serve exclusively the domestic market. Similarly,
the relative presence of two-way traders enlarges among very large, large and medium
ﬁrms (94%, 93% and 83% respectively), rather than among small ﬁrms (54%). As regards
the sectoral classiﬁcation, the highest participation rate is among the science based and
specialized suppliers groups. The percentage of two-way traders is much higher within the
group of foreign owned group (which are by deﬁnition multinationals) than in the case of
non foreign owned (94% vs. 64%).
There is also much variation among two-way traders with respect to workforce compo-
sition and wages. Two-way traders localised in the northern regions outperform, in terms
of both employment and workers’ salaries, those located in the Center and the South. The
same holds for two-way traders belonging to the very large, to the science based sector and
to the foreign owned group of ﬁrms. Hence, these empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm a high degree
of heterogeneity in terms of employment structure and wages not only among ﬁrms with a
diﬀerent degree of international involvement but also between internationalized ﬁrms with
diﬀerent characteristics in terms of geographic location, sector, size, etc.
Finally, kernel densities reported in Figure 113 illustrate that the empirical diﬀer-
ences between two-way traders and non traders we have discussed above, hold not only
when considering average values within industries, but also when considering the whole
frequency distribution of the examined variables. In fact, two-way traders appear to dom-
inate non internationalized ﬁrms for almost all values of the frequency distribution of
ﬁrm size, skilled worker share, wage levels and wage gaps. Moreover, the intra and inter
groups heterogeneity detected in Table 4 do not appear to be reduced when a sectoral
disaggregation at 2-digit level is considered. In Appendix 2, kernel densities are supplied
for two 2-digit sectors (wearing and apparel vs. paper and allied products), showing that
remarkable diversities exist between the two industries not only in average values but also
when considering the whole frequency distribution of the examined variables for two-way
traders as opposed to non internationalized ﬁrms 14.
4 Testing the links between trade and wages
So far, we have delivered an unconditional picture of the relationship between the ﬁrms’
internationalization status and their employment and wage structure for Italian manu-
facturing, largely based on average values for the examined period. In this section we
will check the robustness of the previous ﬁndings by: 1) simultaneously controlling for
the import and export status; 2) considering all the time span available (1993-1997); 3)
controlling parametrically for additional (observed and unobserved) determinants of the
13The kernel density shown in this work were performed using gbutils, a package of programs for para-
metric and non-parametric analysis of panel data, distributed under the General Public License and freely
available at http://www.cafed.eu/gbutils. If not else speciﬁed, density estimation is performed using Epa-
nenchnikov kernel and setting the bandwidth following the “rules” suggested in Section 3.4 of Silverman
(1981).
14Detailed tables are available from the authors upon request, highlighting these inter-sectoral diﬀerences
for all the key variables illustrated above, namely size, work-force composition, wage levels and wage gaps.
13employment and wage structure at the ﬁrm level.
As recalled earlier, the empirical literature has analyzed the links between trade, em-
ployment and wages almost exclusively by focusing on the role of exports. In these con-
tributions, export premia are traditionally expressed as the coeﬃcient associated with an
exporter status dummy obtained by regressing the relevant dependent variable on an ex-
porter status dummy and a set of control variables (typically industry, region and ﬁrm
size; see for example the seminal paper Bernard and Jensen (1999)). Clearly no causal in-
terpretation should be attached to such premia. The same holds with respect to the below
β coeﬃcients representing two way trader, only importer and only exporter percentage
premia 15 with respect to the baseline category of non internationalized ﬁrms. We shall
estimate the following equation
yit = αA+βAtwowaytradersit+γAonlyimporterit+φAonlyexporterit+θAcontrolsit+υit
(1)
Dependent variables are expressed alternatively as 16: the number of employees, the
percentage of non-production workers, the average wage of all workers, the average wage
of non production workers, the average wage of production workers and the wage gap.
As controls we will employ the logarithm of the number of employees 17 , calendar year
dummies, sectoral dummies and regional dummies.
In the subsequent stage of our regression analysis we will further check if, once time in-
variant observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the ﬁrm level is taken into account, such
diﬀerences between ﬁrms involved in international trade and the other ﬁrms persist. This
is done by employing a standard unobserved eﬀects linear panel data model (ﬁxed eﬀects,
FE). Premia are traditionally estimated with simple OLS regressions because FE washes
out time constant heterogeneity and the researcher usually wants to give a picture of ﬁrm
heterogeneity associated with international trade involvement, being it ﬁxed in time or
not. From a diﬀerent perspective, FE can be useful to give a “more causal” interpretation
of the estimated coeﬃcients, since it basically estimates a correlation between a change
in the trade status and a change of the dependent variables under analysis. Nevertheless,
we should be careful when giving such a causal interpretation of the coeﬃcients estimated
with the FE regression. For example, it might well be that a shock at a ﬁrm level contem-
poraneously determines a switching into exporting (or importing) and a variation in the
dependent variable under analysis. Keeping this caveat into account, the following is the
linear unobserved eﬀects model that we estimate by using the within transformation 18
yit = αB+βBtwowaytradersit+γBonlyimporterit+φBonlyexporterit+θBcontrolsit+υit
(2)
As controls we will employ the logarithm of the number of employees and calendar
year dummies, given that sectoral and regional dummies are embedded in the ﬁrm speciﬁc
15The exact percentage diﬀerential is given by (e
β
A − 1) · 100. The coeﬃcients for the regression with
percentage of non production workers as dependent variable are already in percentage values. See also
footnote 16.
16For all these variables, except the share of non production workers, we use log values. When the
percentage of non production workers is the dependent variable, we use absolute values.
17 We omit this control variable when using as dependent variable the logarithm of the number of
employees.
18Using ﬁrst diﬀerencing instead of demeaning does not change the main results.
14Table 5: Parametric Analysis: Number of Employees, Percentage of Non Production
Workers, Wage (1993-1997)
Num. of Employees % Non Prod. Workers Wage
model a model b model a model b model a model b
Two way traders 0.633 0.035 10.009 0.253 0.119 0.039
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.358] [0.000] [0.000]
Only Imp 0.177 0.022 5.408 0.156 0.105 0.016
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.435] [0.000] [0.007]
Only Exp 0.155 0.019 5.901 0.227 0.050 0.029
[0.000] [0.063] [0.000] [0.439] [0.000] [0.005]
Observations 60662 60662 60662 60662 60660 60660
R-squared 0.15 0.95 0.33 0.95 0.42 0.86
Note: Model a: Pooled OLS. Model b: FE. Sectoral, regional, year dummies and size (log of number of employees)
are included as controls.
intercepts19. As the ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows, we estimate very signiﬁcant premia in
terms of the number of employees for all the categories of internationalized ﬁrms. How-
ever, what strikes is the magnitude of the premium of two-way traders, about 65%, with
respect to those for the other two categories of ﬁrms involved only partially in interna-
tional trade, respectively 16% and 17% for only importers and only exporters. Therefore,
even controlling for the usual sources of heterogeneity, it is conﬁrmed that being involved
both in importing and exporting is associated with the highest premium in term of ﬁrm
size.
This ordering conforms with what found by Bernard et al. (2007) for the US and by
Muuls and Pisu (2007) for Belgium. Once we apply the ﬁxed eﬀect model all the coeﬃcients
remain statistically signiﬁcant at 10% signiﬁcance level; however the gap between two
way traders, whose estimated advantage with respect non internationalized ﬁrms roughly
halves, and one way traders shrinks. Assuming that selection into the three trading
categories is due only to ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, this fact would signal that ﬁrm size is
probably a more stringent precondition for being two-way trader than for being one way
trader; and that diﬀerences among the three ﬁrms’ categories we consider are much lower
in terms of post-entry eﬀects.
Let us now turn to the investigation of ﬁrms skill structure that is proxied by the
percentage of non-production workers over total employment. The third column of Table
5 displays the estimated premia. They are all statistically signiﬁcant. Once again, two
way traders exhibit a higher premium, that is about 10%, with respect the one way
traders categories, that are about half of the former. This ordering of trading categories
conforms with what found by Bernard et al. (2007) for US. However, once we apply the
ﬁxed eﬀects model all the coeﬃcients turn out to be insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
19As robustness check, we estimate equation 1 and equation 2 including as additional controls the
skill intensity variable, proxied by the percentage of white collars, and the foreign ownership dummy.
Moreover, we repeat all the econometric exercises using a balanced panel. Similar results are found for all
the speciﬁcations and with diﬀerent numbers of observations.
15Table 6: Parametric Analysis: Wage Non Production Workers, Wage Production Workers,
Wage Gap (1993-1997)
Wage Non Prod. Workers Wage Prod. Workers Wage Gap
model a model b model a model b model a model b
Two way traders 0.078 0.046 0.069 0.034 0.039 0.004
[0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.836]
Only Imp 0.073 0.018 0.080 0.013 0.016 0.006
[0.000] [0.110] [0.000] [0.077] [0.098] [0.645]
Only Exp 0.026 0.035 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.005
[0.010] [0.063] [0.000] [0.028] [0.004] [0.779]
Observations 56225 56225 60014 60014 55620 55620
R-squared 0.20 0.71 0.29 0.76 0.06 0.60
Note: Model a: Pooled OLS. Model b: FE. Sectoral, regional, year dummies and size (log of number of employees)
are included as controls.
Assuming that selection into the three trading categories is due only to ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects, this last result could indicate that being more skill intensive than the average is
possibly only a precondition for being internationalized not a consequence of international
activities. This last ﬁnding on exporters conforms with the results of another study on
Italian manufacturing that compare export starters to never exporters (Serti and Tomasi
(2007)) and with the results of Maurin et al. (2002) for France: both papers ﬁnd no clear
evidence for a causal eﬀect of exporting on the distribution of workers across production
and non production activities, even if both papers ﬁnd that exporting positively correlates
with the share of non production workers on total employment.
The last two columns of Table 5 report the estimation results for the average wage
variable. We detect very similar premia for two way traders and only importers, around
10%, and a lower diﬀerential for only exporters, about 5%. Introducing ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects, the coeﬃcients remain statistically signiﬁcant but decrease in size. However, in
this case, the estimated percentage advantage of only exporters decreases to a lesser extent
with respect to the other two categories (and especially with respect to only importers),
and the estimated coeﬃcient of only exporters becomes very similar to that of two way
traders. These changes in the estimated coeﬃcients determined by the inclusion of ﬁrm
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects might indicate that two way traders and only importers have much
greater ex-ante advantages relative to only exporters and that instead possible ex-post
eﬀects are similar between the three groups of traders.
The results on average wages could be determined by the fact that internationalized
ﬁrms have a higher share of non production workers with respect to “domestic” ﬁrms and
those non production workers are on average better paid relative to the other workers.
Hence, we will separately consider the average wage of non-production workers and the
average wage of production workers as additional independent variables.
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 6 show the results for the average wage of the two
categories of workers. Consistent with the predictions by Yeaple (2005) and with the em-
pirical ﬁndings of Bernard and Jensen (1999), we ﬁnd that only exporters exhibit a wage
16premium, for both production and non-production workers, relative to non international-
ized ﬁrms. This wage premium amounts to 3% in our data. Here we additionally show
that wage premia for exporters are robust to taking into account also importing activities,
and that premia also exist for importers. Moreover, wage premia are even higher in the
case of two way traders and only importers, and they are roughly the same, about 7%.
However, as already noted in the case of average wages, once we include ﬁrm speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects we observe a substantial reduction in the coeﬃcients for only importers, which
also become non signiﬁcant in the case of non production workers wages. These changes in
the estimated coeﬃcients determined by the inclusion of ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects reinforce
the above hypothesis that two way traders and only importers have ex-ante advantages
relatively higher than only exporters in terms of wages.
The last two columns of Table 6 display the estimation results using the wage gap
as dependent variable. Regressions yield very similar patterns for the three categories of
ﬁrms. In the baseline speciﬁcation without ﬁxed eﬀects we ﬁnd that ﬁrms involved in in-
ternational trade are characterized by higher levels of wage inequality between production
and non production workers, of about 2-3%, with respect to the other ﬁrms. However,
once we wash out ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, all the relevant coeﬃcients turn out to be
statistically insigniﬁcant. Probably hiring more and better paid non production workers
is only a pre-requisite for entering international markets, not a consequence of it. In other
words: ﬁrms seem to need higher skilled worker shares to internationalise, and this gen-
erates inequality. However, once they engage into international activities, their wage gaps
tend to persist unaltered.
5 Market heterogeneity and diversiﬁcation as sources of in-
equality?
The results of the previous sections show that a substantial fraction of the observed intra
industry heterogeneity is related to the international activities of the ﬁrms. Two-way
traders, only importers and only exporters are bigger, more skilled intensive and they pay
higher wages with respect to non traders. Moreover, we observe ﬁrm’s heterogeneity also
within the category of internationalized ﬁrms. The degree of involvement in international
trade and some characteristics of ﬁrms, such as region and sector in which they are active,
impact on employment structure and wages. In particular we observed that the two-way
traders are the most interesting and by far the most numerically important grouping of
internationalized ﬁrms.
In this section we will further investigate the heterogeneity within the two-way traders
category, concentrating on two sets of characteristics. We shall ﬁrst focus on the variety
of countries of origin and destination of imports and exports (Section 5.1). We shall then
assess the role of the degree of sectoral and geographic diversiﬁcation of internationalized
ﬁrms (Section 5.2). To do that, we consider the workforce composition and wage structure
of the two-way traders, relating them with country of destination and origin, and with the
number of products and the number of countries with which they trade.
17Table 7: Countries of destination and origin: two-way traders
Number of Employees % Non Prod. Workers Wage
Two way Traders Two way Traders Two way Traders
exp to imp from exp to imp from exp to imp from
EEC and Efta 100 100 100 100 100 100
Usa and Canada 118.1 160.4 104.7 115.8 101.5 106.6
CEECs 145.8 219.0 108.5 107.2 103.5 104.9
Nic 134.8 211.9 108.1 120.7 102.6 106.1
Opec 159.7 425.4 111.9 119.5 104.9 108.1
Other 131.5 204.6 110.1 113.3 103.7 103.8
EEC and Efta* 132 133 27 27 35.9 36.0
Wage Non Prod. Workers Wage Prod. Workers Wage Gap
Two way Traders Two way Traders Two way Traders
exp to imp from exp to imp from exp to imp from
EEC and Efta 100 100 100 100 100 100
Usa and Canada 100.8 104.9 100.6 103.3 100.5 102.5
CEECs 102.8 104.0 101.8 102.7 102.0 102.5
Nic 101.7 103.4 101.1 102.4 101.1 101.9
Opec 103.4 105.3 102.5 104.1 101.6 101.9
Other 102.4 102.3 102.0 100.9 101.0 102.6
EEC and Efta* 48.4 48.6 32.8 32.9 1.519 1.523
Note:100 = EEC and Efta
*Absolute values
5.1 Market heterogeneity
Table 7 distinguishes between ﬁrms that trade with less developed countries from ﬁrms
involved in import and export from and to more advanced countries (EEC, Efta, Usa and
Canada), which tend to be less “distant” in geographic terms and, even more so, in terms
of cultural and institutional proximity.
One important outcome from this table is that ﬁrms exporting towards advanced coun-
tries tend to be comparatively smaller, to pay lower (aggregate, production and non pro-
duction) wages and to be less intensive in the use of non production workers. This evidence
could be explained by the fact that, once the extra costs of engaging in foreign markets
is faced, entering more “distant” markets entails higher ﬁxed cost that only the most
successful ﬁrms can aﬀord. The last piece of evidence could be interpreted through the
lens of H-O theory and of the peculiar Italian specialization pattern: Italian ﬁrms tend to
export relatively low skill intensive goods to developed countries and relatively more skill
intensive items to countries that are comparatively less endowed with this factor of pro-
duction. This ordering holds also with respect the wage gap: exporting to less developed
countries maps into higher inequality.
A further fact emerging from the data is that some of these intra-industry diﬀerences
are even more striking when considering import activities of ﬁrms. Firms that import
from non developed and/or non European countries are even bigger, pay even higher
(aggregate, production and non production) wages and tend to be even more skill intensive
18as compared to ﬁrms exporting towards those geographic areas. Importers from these
countries are “better” ﬁrms possibly because they have to incur higher ﬁxed costs to obtain
information import markets which are more distant (in technological, geographical and
cultural terms). Moreover, importers from USA and Canada exhibit a higher skill intensity
than ﬁrms exporting towards those countries. This might have to do with the specialization
proﬁle of this country. Italian ﬁrms export more traditional goods towards North America,
while they import more high tech goods from that area, and this might imply that lower
skill intensity is needed to tackle exports to, than imports from, those countries. By
contrast, ﬁrms that import from less developed countries may have concentrated their
activities at home in more skill intensive production tasks, outsourcing from the South
of the world unskilled intensive stages of production. This ordering is maintained also
with respect to wage gaps: importing from less developed and/or non European countries
reﬂects into higher inequality.
5.2 Sectoral and Country diversiﬁcation
We have just noted that countries of origin and destination matter in terms of employment
and wage structures of ﬁrms engaged in international trade. How about the degree of
geographical and sectoral diversiﬁcation of these ﬁrms’ international activities? We shall
here present an exploratory analysis of the role played by these characteristics in the case
of two-way traders. We shall do it by using, on the export side, information on the number
of sectors in which a ﬁrm exports (NSE) and the number of countries served by the ﬁrm
(NCE). On the import side, we use the available information on the number of sectors in
which imports are concentrated (NSI) and the number of countries a ﬁrm imports from
(NCI). We divide the four variables into seven categories. The ﬁrst category includes ﬁrms
which export to (import from) one to 5 countries (or they export/import in 1 to 5 sectors);
the second category from 6 to 10; the third from 11 to 15; the fourth from 16 to 20; the
ﬁfth from 21 to 25; the sixth from 26 to 30 and the seventh more than 30.
To examine how two-way traders’ country and sector diversiﬁcation relate to employ-
ment and wage structure we perform a set of multivariate kernel regressions. In Figure 2- 7
we show the results only for wage gaps, but similar conclusions can be drawn for the other
variables. As in a standard parametric regression, the aim of this technique is to estimate
the conditional expectation of a dependent variable, y, given other explanatory variables,
x and z. However in this case we do not assume that the relationship between the depen-
dent and the independent variables is linear. We instead estimate non parametrically by
multivariate kernel methods the conditional expectation of y given the observed combina-
tions of the explanatory variables x and z, i.e. E(y|x;z). This is a non-parametric method
which does not impose any a priori structure on the data themselves (Pagan and Ullah
(1999)) and uses as input the observed level of the dependent and explanatory variables
(xi;yi;zi) of the N ﬁrms under analysis. Using the kernel estimation technique, smooth
surfaces have been obtained from the discrete set of observations (the observed triples
(xi;yi;zi). The use of logarithmic scales allows us to represent ﬁrms with very diﬀerent
combinations of x and z on the same plot so that the identiﬁcation of possible patterns
becomes possible.
The main message of this analysis is that the more diversiﬁed a ﬁrm is, both in terms
of sectors in which trades and in terms of countries with which it is connected, the higher
its wage gap is (the same regularity applies for size, wages and skill intensity). This





























































































































































































































































22fact holds quite robustly for all the combinations between the various possible couples
of explanatory variables (NCE, NSE, NCI, NSI) and each dependent variable. In the
following we show some of the estimated multivariate kernel regressions among the various
feasible combinations of dependent variables.
For example, the kernel estimate of the conditional expectation of the wage gap given
the number of sectors to which ﬁrms exports (NSE) and the number of sectors from which
ﬁrms import (NSI) is reported in Figure 2. To a given combination of NSE and NSI on
the horizontal plane corresponds a relative level of the estimated conditional expectation
of the wage gap, i.e. a vertical height of the surface. If we move toward “North-East”
combinations of NSE and NSI the vertical height of the surface increases. This means
that the size of the ﬁrms is an increasing function of the number of sectors in which they
import and export. The interpretation of the remaining surfaces we show in the paper is
analogous.
To summirise, the descriptive evidence presented in the last two subsections suggests
that both the characteristics of export and import markets and the diversiﬁcation strate-
gies of ﬁrms, in terms of the number of the markets and sectors, must be taken into account
if one wants to understand the determinants of the wage and employment structure of in-
ternationalized ﬁrms.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis yields a set of interesting results. Fist, we ﬁnd that two-way traders have
a higher propensity to employ non-production workers, exhibit signiﬁcant wage gaps, but
also pay higher wages for both production and non production workers, relative to non
internationalized ﬁrms and to ﬁrms which are involved only in either export or import.
This seems to suggest that, while involvement in international trade is associated with
increases in distributional disparities, workers are most likely to be better oﬀ when they
are employed in these ﬁrms than in non (or less) internationalized ﬁrms, as they are likely
to earn higher wages in absolute terms.
Second, some between ﬁrm heterogeneity is observable even within the two-way traders
category. Interestingly, we observe that ﬁrms exporting to the more advanced countries
(EU and USA) are comparatively smaller, employ less white collars, pay lower wages
than ﬁrms exporting to other less developed countries. This could suggest that entering
“distant” markets entails higher sunk costs than relatively “closer” countries. A similar
picture is observable from the import side, with the only exception of the USA. While
exporters to USA have similar characteristics as the one trading with EU, the overseas
importers from that country employ a higher percentage of non production workers and
pay higher wages with respect to importers from the European countries. This might
reﬂect the speciﬁc pattern of trade relationships between Italy and the USA. Finally, we
observe that more diversiﬁed ﬁrms, in terms of both sectoral and geographic dispersion
of trade, exhibit greater wage gaps but also pay higher wages to all categories of workers,
relative to ﬁrms that trade with a lower number of countries and in a lower number of
sectors.
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25Appendix 1: Checking the consistency of the merged database
In order to assess the consistency of our panel constructed through the linkages of the
two distinct datasets, we compare the sectoral and size distribution of our new sample of
ﬁrms with the one characterising the entire population of ﬁrms in the MICRO 1 dataset.
We compute a chi-square test for independence which evaluates whether the distribution
of the obtained sample (across sectors and size classes) is statistically diﬀerent from the
one observed in the initial population. The test is carried on considering the year-by-year
distribution and the frequencies of the pooled period, from 1993 to 1997. A large value
of the test statistic for the chi-squared test, indicates that the frequencies observed in the
sample is very diﬀerent from the one observed in the population. In this case, the null
hypothesis of equality of the distributions will likely be rejected.
Tables 1A and ?? report the share of each manufacturing sectors in terms of number
of ﬁrms for the new database and the entire population contained in MICRO 1. The
chi-square test is deﬁned for the following hypotheses:
H0 Sectoral distribution of the sample (balanced panel) does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
from the one characterising the entire population
H1 Distributions diﬀer.
According to the values reported in Table we accept the null hypothesis, that is the
distribution of the number of ﬁrms in each sector in the sample does not diﬀer from
that of the entire population. Similar results, reported in Table 1B , have been obtained
comparing the size distribution. The small values for the chi-square conﬁrm that there is
an high correspondence between the frequencies of the merged database and the one of
the entire population of ﬁrms.
26Table 1A: Chi-Square Test for the sectoral distribution
Sector Merged Data Micro 1 Merged Data Micro 1 Merged Data Micro 1
1993 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995
Food, Beverages 6.55 6.97 6.66 6.96 6.44 7
Tobacco 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.08
Textiles 9.4 9.18 9.64 9.3 8.98 8.79
Wearing, Apparel 8.73 7.77 8.88 7.85 7.92 6.97
Leather 5.84 5.38 5.84 5.37 5.69 5.36
Wood Manuf. 2.46 2.57 2.49 2.58 2.63 2.64
Paper 2.09 2.18 2.22 2.29 2.48 2.49
Printing, Publishing 2.94 3.55 3.01 3.63 2.86 3.52
Cook 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.38
Chemicals Product 3.55 3.65 3.68 3.76 3.74 3.83
Rubber, Plastics 5.12 5.03 5.25 5.15 5.24 5.18
Non-Metallic Min 6.69 6.65 6.39 6.44 6.15 6.32
Basic Metals 2.77 2.89 2.7 2.88 2.89 3.03
Metal Product 11.69 12.12 11.61 12.21 12.3 12.79
Industrial Mach. 13.07 12.57 13 12.47 13.39 12.67
Oﬃce Machinery 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.25
Electrical Mach. 4.37 4.28 4.34 4.29 4.41 4.32
Radio, TV 1.16 1.16 1.15 1.2 1.38 1.31
Medical 2.24 2.1 2.22 2.04 2.46 2.17
Motor Vehicles 1.92 2.05 1.81 1.98 1.87 2.06
Other Transport 1.16 1.29 1.09 1.22 1.18 1.27
Forniture Manuf. 7.46 7.82 7.19 7.56 7.13 7.53
Recycling 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Chi-square 0.00 0.00 0.00
D.o.F 22.00 22.00 22.00
Chi- Square(22, 0.05) 33.92 33.92 33.92
p-values 1.000 1.000 1.000
1996 1996 1997 1997 93-97 93-97
Food, Beverages 6.47 6.99 6.25 6.79 6.5 6.91
Tobacco 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08
Textiles 9.02 8.94 8.08 7.95 9.11 9.13
Wearing, Apparel 7.38 6.6 6.74 5.94 8.06 7.34
Leather 6.41 5.75 4.38 3.93 5.69 5.3
Wood Manuf. 2.77 2.79 2.73 2.66 2.59 2.64
Paper 2.41 2.46 2.42 2.56 2.3 2.33
Printing, Publishing 2.77 3.38 2.82 3.44 2.89 3.5
Cook 0.41 0.4 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.42
Chemicals Product 3.75 3.98 3.76 4.11 3.69 3.84
Rubber, Plastics 5.63 5.43 6.15 5.94 5.42 5.13
Non-Metallic Min 6.08 6.33 6.18 6.2 6.33 6.65
Basic Metals 2.92 3.03 2.93 3.1 2.83 3.03
Metal Product 12.29 12.8 13.02 13.39 12.1 12.2
Industrial Mach. 12.98 12.36 14.14 13.65 13.27 12.74
Oﬃce Machinery 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.23
Electrical Mach. 4.41 4.25 4.85 4.63 4.45 4.26
Radio, TV 1.44 1.4 1.43 1.4 1.29 1.18
Medical 2.58 2.29 2.57 2.26 2.39 2.07
Motor Vehicles 2.04 2.17 2.1 2.24 1.93 2.12
Other Transport 1.04 1.18 0.98 1.15 1.1 1.26
Forniture Manuf. 6.9 7.13 7.57 7.78 7.25 7.59
Recycling 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.07
Chi-square 0.00 0.00 0.00
D.o.F 22.00 22.00 22.00
Chi- Square(22, 0.05) 33.92 33.92 33.92
p-values 1.000 1.000 1.000
27Table 1B: Chi-Square Test for the size distribution
Sector Merged Data Micro 1 Merged Data Micro 1 Merged Data Micro 1
1993 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995
Size 1 62.89 62.87 64.2 64.32 62.61 63.76
Size 2 31.63 31.33 30.66 30.2 31.72 30.43
Size 3 3.44 3.37 3.26 3.19 3.56 3.37
Size 4 2.04 2.43 1.89 2.29 2.1 2.44
Chi-square 0.08 0.13 0.11
D.o.F 3.00 3.00 3.00
Chi- Square(3, 0.05) 7.81 7.81 7.81
p-values 0.99 0.99 0.99
1996 1996 1997 1997 93-97 93-97
Size 1 61.55 62.42 60.71 61.8 62.57 61.81
Size 2 32.6 31.68 33.28 32.1 31.84 32.13
Size 3 3.7 3.41 3.75 3.51 3.52 3.53
Size 4 2.15 2.49 2.26 2.6 2.07 2.54
Chi-square 0.11 0.12 0.10
D.o.F 3.00 3.00 3.00
Chi- Square(3, 0.05) 7.81 7.81 7.81
p-values 0.99 0.99 0.99
28Appendix 2: Sectoral Analysis
Table 2A: Sectoral Analysis: Percentage of Non Production Workers (average value 1993-
1997)
Only Exp. Only Imp. Niether Exp. Two way Two way Traders / Ranking
nor Imp. Traders Neither Exp. nor Imp.
2-digit sector
Food Bev. 20.7 21.3 16.1 27.6 1.72 12
Tobacco 14.8 15.3 10.3 16.3 1.59 16
Textiles 16.0 13.1 8.1 22.1 2.74 3
Apparel 9.9 8.0 2.0 21.9 10.95 1
Leather 9.0 6.6 2.8 14.0 4.96 2
Wood Manuf. 18.0 13.0 11.6 16.7 1.44 19
Paper 15.7 15.6 16.2 20.4 1.27 21
Print Publ. 27.4 46.7 26.3 38.2 1.46 18
Reﬁned Petroleum 57.9 41.5 29.0 55.0 1.89 7
Chemi. Prod. 41.4 31.6 30.5 47.4 1.55 17
Rubber Plastics 19.2 14.1 12.1 22.8 1.89 8
NonMetallic Min 16.0 20.0 18.5 22.2 1.20 22
Basic Metals 18.2 15.4 13.1 22.3 1.71 15
Metal Prod. 17.9 17.7 12.8 21.9 1.71 14
Industrial Mach 27.9 26.2 17.6 33.2 1.89 9
Oﬃce Mach 46.8 95.3 50.1 65.7 1.31 20
Electrical Mach 27.0 22.3 17.0 30.8 1.81 11
Radio, Tv 34.8 30.8 20.2 40.3 1.99 5
Medical Prec. 31.2 44.5 23.8 40.8 1.71 13
Motor Vehicles 17.9 15.1 12.1 23.5 1.95 6
Other Trasp.Equ 23.8 14.1 10.7 25.6 2.39 4
Manuf. 19.9 13.6 11.4 21.1 1.86 10
Recycling 37.0 27.4 33.0 35.0 1.06 23
Totala Manuf. 20.0 20.6 12.2 26.6 2.18
Pavitt’s taxonomy
Supplier dominated 16.8 17.9 10.0 21.6 2.15 1
Scale intensive 20.5 20.8 15.6 26.8 1.72 4
Specialised suppliers 28.7 25.0 17.6 34.1 1.93 3
Science based 41.3 43.0 26.2 50.9 1.95 2
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31Appendix 3: Sectoral and Country diversiﬁcation
Table 3A: NSE, NCE and Wage Gap, 1993
NCE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1.42 1.44 1.47 1.42 1.53 1.50 1.58
2 1.38 1.50 1.46 1.46 1.51 1.51 1.54
3 1.42 1.51 1.43 1.51 1.56 1.59 1.61
NSE 4 1.67 1.35 1.57 1.64 1.43 1.56 1.52
5 1.11 1.33 1.65 1.49 1.50 1.52 1.61
6 2.13 1.69 1.32 1.62 1.41 1.58
7 1.61 2.08 2.53 1.51 1.92 1.49 1.73
Table 3B: NSI, NCI and Wage Gap, 1993
NCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1.42 1.47 1.46 1.48 1.23 1.50
2 1.51 1.51 1.63 1.56 1.83 1.62
3 1.61 1.56 1.51 1.48 1.46 1.65 1.48
NSI 4 1.50 1.63 1.67 1.57 1.70 1.51 1.27
5 1.61 1.60 1.65 1.60 1.62 1.22 2.14
6 0.82 1.81 1.59 1.65 1.39 1.36
7 1.26 1.90 1.67 1.51 1.63 1.61 1.77
32Table 3C: NSE, NCE and Wage, 1993
NCE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 32.5 32.7 33.0 31.9 34.6 35.1 38.8
2 35.8 37.0 36.8 35.7 36.6 37.8 39.8
3 33.3 40.6 39.2 38.8 37.7 39.3 41.1
NSE 4 42.4 40.5 41.0 41.8 40.6 41.9 42.9
5 38.1 40.9 45.9 49.3 41.4 40.9 45.2
6 36.7 44.5 38.1 34.8 33.7 44.6
7 35.5 35.7 27.4 34.9 38.8 34.7 46.0
Table 3D: NSI, NCI and Wage, 1993
NCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
hline
1 32.3 34.9 35.9 36.7 30.9 35.9
2 36.3 37.9 39.1 39.9 41.4 39.6
3 38.5 41.2 42.2 41.1 38.5 36.4 37.8
NSI 4 40.6 43.7 45.3 48.6 45.6 51.2 46.4
5 37.1 42.9 45.7 48.4 45.3 50.4 39.3
6 35.8 43.0 49.5 47.0 49.6 40.7
7 40.8 47.5 49.9 53.5 50.7 47.3 52.2
Table 3E: NSE, NCE and Wage Production Workers, 1993
NCE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 30.9 30.8 30.9 30.3 31.7 32.3 33.8
2 33.0 33.0 33.2 32.5 32.9 33.6 35.1
3 31.0 35.3 35.2 33.6 32.5 33.3 34.6
NSE 4 33.4 36.5 33.9 33.2 36.1 35.1 36.5
5 38.2 37.9 36.1 37.1 36.4 34.7 36.5
6 24.6 37.6 32.9 30.2 31.4 36.3
7 29.3 27.1 17.3 30.3 29.8 29.9 36.0
33Table 3F: NSI, NCI and Wage Production Workers, 1993
NCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 30.8 31.9 32.9 33.6 30.8 35.4
2 32.6 33.7 33.4 34.0 33.1 36.7
3 33.5 35.3 36.1 36.1 32.6 32.2 33.9
NSI 4 35.8 35.8 36.5 38.8 36.4 43.8 40.9
5 33.0 35.7 36.6 39.1 37.4 48.0 27.3
6 40.7 35.2 39.6 37.4 43.7 36.0
7 39.8 34.9 38.7 42.0 39.1 36.7 38.3
Table 3G: NSE, NCE and Wage Non Production Workers, 1993
NCE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 43.7 43.9 44.6 42.4 47.6 47.8 52.9
2 45.1 48.5 47.5 46.4 48.5 50.0 52.8
3 42.8 52.2 49.1 48.7 49.5 52.2 54.0
NSE 4 52.7 48.9 52.7 53.8 50.8 53.9 54.7
5 42.3 50.5 58.0 58.0 51.8 51.1 57.9
6 49.7 62.8 42.0 47.9 44.5 56.0
7 47.1 56.3 43.8 45.1 60.5 44.5 60.6
Table 3H: NSI, NCI and Wage Non Production Workers, 1993
NCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 43.4 46.2 46.8 47.5 37.8 52.9
2 48.3 49.7 52.9 51.6 59.2 54.2
3 52.9 54.1 53.1 52.0 48.5 50.8 50.1
NSI 4 53.5 57.7 59.7 60.3 60.8 65.7 50.6
5 54.8 55.1 59.4 61.4 55.0 57.0 58.1
6 33.5 62.2 61.3 61.3 60.7 49.3
7 49.6 65.4 64.1 63.2 62.9 58.7 67.0
34Table 3I: NSE, NCE and Percentage of Non Production Workers, 1993
NCE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 21.1 22.7 23.2 22.1 24.6 24.5 27.4
2 29.8 30.5 30.9 29.2 28.7 29.6 31.1
3 26.1 36.0 35.3 37.9 34.6 35.0 36.7
NSE 4 39.2 39.4 36.9 42.4 34.5 39.4 39.8
5 20.7 30.4 45.9 45.8 42.0 41.9 41.6
6 46.4 34.0 71.3 30.5 24.1 45.2
7 37.9 29.6 37.9 30.8 22.9 33.0 41.5
Table 3J: NSI, NCI and Percentage of Non Production Workers, 1993
NCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 21.5 27.0 29.0 31.2 19.4 11.0
2 28.2 q 30.9 33.5 36.8 34.8 22.8
3 28.6 34.7 35.8 36.4 35.6 34.6 24.9
NSI 4 29.1 36.4 38.2 44.9 39.1 34.2 52.7
5 17.0 37.1 41.2 43.8 46.4 40.4 39.4
6 38.1 33.2 48.1 41.9 34.1 27.6
7 20.9 39.8 46.9 48.9 43.9 46.9 48.6
35